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Myths, Mines and Ground Clearance

Myths, Mines and
Ground Clearance
Building on an article published in issue 2.3 of this Journal, the author
discusses some ofthe prevailing myths that beset the humanitarian demining
(HD) industry and which he believes restrict its progress. Intended as a
discussion prompt, some of the points he makes may be contentious.

by Andy Smith, AVS Mine

Action Consultants
In 1998, I wrote an arricle for th is
journal about common myths in mine
clearance. Since that time, I have received
many messages supporting what I wrote,
a nd none taking the opposing view. The
last of these messages was received just a
couple of months ago- showing that rhe
on line back issues of this journal are still
being used. It may be usefu l for you to
read over rhar article before arguing
strongly against anything in th is article
(see http:// maic.jmu.edu/journal/2.3/ fearures/myths.htm).
Looking over rhe original arricle, I
"A self-replicating
would change a few lines and alter the
robot" in Bosnia
stress here and the re, but I believe that
Herzegovina.

the list rema ins a relevant record of
unhelpful m y ths.
A few have been partly addressed,
then forgotten. For example, the development of the new International Mine
Action Standards (!MAS) was based on
an acceptance th at it was nor up to the
West ro d ictate derails of operation ro
National Authorities. T his was largely
responsible for the relative success of those
standards, but may be being forgotten as
more standards are added and the original User Focus Group is marginalised.
A few have become more complicated.
For example, the use of modern munitions
rhar act as mines but are nor designed as
min es com pli cates rhe quest ion of
whether mine use is really in decline in
some areas.

O ne or rwo have become entrenched.
Fo r examp le, the idea that a Westerntra in ed ex p losive ordnance disposal
(EOD) man is someh ow needed or is
naturally superior to a locally experienced
demincr is now "presumed. " In fact, more
trained EOD men serving with Western
mi litary grou ps have died in demining
over th e past t hree years than local
deminers with a few weeks' training. In
m any cases, the highly trained victims
were so arrogant rhar they took risks that
d1e locals d id nor dream of doing. T heir
military training was nor very appropriate.
What fo llows is a summary of the
lies, myrhs and misconceptions addressed
in my last article, with som e new additions append ed .

"If we can send men to
he moon, we must be
ble to do better than a
nan with a prod!"
Critics often present the "man with
a prod" as an unsophisticated caveman
technology. In fac t, it is m o re sophistica ted tha n any arrificial device yet
available. No matter how many millions
of dollars are th rown at robotics, it wi ll
be a very long time before machines equal
rhe sophisti cated array of d ata gathering
and processing equipment rhar is a human
being. When that is finally achieved, it will
be even longer before that technology can
be bu ilt into a low-cost, autonomous,
se lf-repairing and self-replicating robot
rhe size of a deminer.

"Mines are the greatest
killers in post-conflict
regions."
In some areas, this is true. In many
areas, it is d1e other detritus of war that
claims th e most lives. The tru th is rhat,
afte r a confl ict is over an d in terna lly
di spl aced perso ns (lOPs) have returned
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Training deminers.

ro rhe home areas, the armaments left
over after conflict are often the greatest
killers of civilians. Since I wrote last, the
term "explosive remnants of war (ERW)"
has been coined to describe all these
items, unused or un exploded, which
often I i tte r barrie areas. Sadly, many of
the civilian accidents occur as a result of
deli berate interaction with the munitions-ou t o f curiosity, bravado or (most
commonly) a desire to earn a few pennies
by recycling the materials in them.

" ore m1nes are being
laid than cleared today."
While still quo ted by the general
public, I hear this argument less often
than in former years- which is ironic
because there is more truth in it now than
there was five years ago. In conflict areas
(Chechnya and Iraq, fo r example), more
mines have been placed than cleared in
rhe last year. But in those post-conflict
areas rhar have a mature mine action
prog ra mme (Afghan istan, Angola,
Cambodia, Croatia, Kosovo, Kurdish
Iraq , Bosnia-Herzegovi na, Mozambique,
ere.), the claim is simply untrue. Sustained
dem ini ng efforrs have cleared vast areas
ofland without any sign ificanr replacement of mines and ordnance. The process
has suppotted the establishment of stability
in many ways and has been an essential part
of internationally supporred efforts tO
break cycles of violence.

" 1nes have no place in
modern warfare."
T he truth is rhar as long as conflicts
continue, victim-initiated devices (mines)
of one kind o r ano ther will be used.
When rhe ch ips are down, figh ting " By
All Available Means" (BAAM!) is normal.
International efforts to alter rhe BAAM
mindser seem ro be the only way ro
change this. Genuine concern over the
long-term effects of weapons will only
become "fashionable" ifled by the world's
do minant m ilitary forces. At present,
Russia, C hina and the United Srares have
nor ban ned the use of ami-personnel
landmines-and all continue to develop
other indiscr im i na te weapons that

serve as victim-activated devices. The
willingness to use mines in recent conflicts
in Afghanistan, Iraq and Chechn ya
seems to have reversed the successes of
rhe In rernarional Campaign to Ban
Landmines (ICBL). So, at rhe start of the new
millennium, numbers of anti-personnel
landmines are falling. Bur the use of
increasingly ind iscrim inate weapons
is increasing.

'You can meet deminers
and find out about
demining at conferences."
l define a "humanitarian deminer"
as someone whose principal day-to-day
activity involves using his/her eyes, dogs,
metal detectors, prodders or other means
to physically clear areas believed to be
mined. These are almost invariably local
people. A deminer is nor someone you
will meet at a conference or someone who
is paid a Western salary. Those people may
be Demining Managers and Technical
Advisers, bur they do nor actually clear
mines themselves. I can think of only a
handful of ex-pars who regularly demine
among rhe many hundreds I have met in
my travels, and these ex-pars do so our of
an obsessive personal commitment, nor
because they are paid to do so. The ex-par
is far more economically occupied in
training and management tasks (often,
20 local deminers can be employed for
the same daily salary of one ex-par, not
to mention other costs).

"Demining is a specialist
ctivity that takes a long
ime to learn."
In almost all countries wirh an active
HD sector, most field deminers are relatively tmeducared local men. They may have
a military background, bur this background
will nor have involved any in-depth training in mine detection and removal. Some
organizations have new deminers working
in a live area within 10 days ofstarting their
training. These deminers will then work
alongside a more experienced person for
further "on-the-job" training. This system
works, and from rhe available accident information, it looks as if rhe highest risk rime
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among deminers is nor their first weeks or
even their first year of work. The truth is
that while demining is a specialist acriviry,
it does nor rake long to learn.

''lbe rules of HD must be
set by Western specialists."
When I wrote on this last time, the
United Nations' published rules were widely
ignored even in programmes under the
control of rhe UN Mine Action Service
(UNMAS). Companies and non-governmemal organizations (NG O s) made up
their own rules, often in competition with
each orher, so best practices were not
shared . W i th rhe development of
improved IMAS, this situation has changed
for rhe berrer. Based on widespread
consultation and flexib ility, the current
IMAS are far more useful than their
predecessors. They are being widely
adopted by individual groups and
Na tiona! Authorities around the world. Even
military demining efforts are increasingly
using the IMAS as a starring point,
although a few of rhe oldest demining
organisations hold our and insist on doing
things as they have always done.
So rhe rules have changed under rhe
leadersh ip of Western specialists, people
who rook great pains ro achieve widespread
practicality. They led rhe process, and
they allowed the real world to dictate the
derail. This was a major achievement,
and rhe inclusion of provisions to update
rhe standards regularly was a real breakthrough. Bur rhe organisation that
achieved this was new and dynamic at
char rime. Today ir seems to be falling into
the turgid bureaucracy of irs predecessors and spending a great deal of effort
justifying its own existence rather rhan
serving the community. A lesson learned
has been rapidly forgotten.
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The truth is still that Western military trai ning is not an adequate, appropriate o r sufficient
preparation for organizing HD.
Ir is also true that there is little
evidence of value in establishing
a remote bureaucracy to "control"
the industry unless that bureaucracy genuinely listens ro it.

eequ1pment
issued to our military
is the best in the
world, so should be
used in HD."

The tru th is th at
de mining equipment has been
developed in the field at a fraction of the costs being spen t
on developing un sui tab le
equipme nt
in
R&D
programmes. If some of that
cost were dedicated ro clearing ground, the money could
achieve far more in terms of
ground cleared.

"A mine cleared is
a limb saved."
Casspir adapted to carry a high-tech sensor.

The reasons why military equipment
is rarely the "best" for demining are varied,
including high cost, inappropriate design
fo r the purpose and unnecessary complexity. Military uses are nor the same as those
in HD. For example, a metal detector may
be used once a year in the military, but
wi ll be used for long hours every day in
demining. The cost of batteries or ergono mi c comfo rt may not be issues for
occasio nal use, bur are in demining.
Sim ilarly, the military requiremenr for
speed can compromise the humanitarian
requirement for safety- so that an appropriate detector for military use may be
one that-"misses" some metal targets.
T he truth is that eq uipment designed fo r a mi litary purpose is rarely
ideal for use in HD.

"Locally made demining
equipment is always of a
low uality."
This is often a clear ass umption
behind the attitude ofequipment purchasers. It is an attitude fostered by Western
suppliers ofequipment who prefer everyone
to source through them. T he demining
supply industry is a sop hi s ti cated,
hard-sell extension of the arms supply
business, so no o ne should expect it
to have honesty as one of irs major aims.
The main advantages ofdemining groups
having their equipment supplied from local
sources are low-cost, ready availability and
easy maintenance o r repair.
T he truth is that adequate, locally
made tools and equipment exist and are
widely used. Sophisticated items such as

blast visors, body armour and blast-resistant
hand-tools are also made and supplied
regionally in Asia and Africa.

e need to spend
llllons of dollars and
se our best brains and
acilities to develop new
quipment for demining."
Since 1994, I have still only seen a few
areas of major change in the equipment
used on th e grou nd. These are in
manual deminer tooling, protection, metal
detectors and mechanical assistance.
None of the recent changes are the
direct result of any new expend iture on
Wes tern resea rch and development
(R&D), although a few have capitalised
on field-led breakthroughs. Reasons for
this failure of R& D effort range from
confused design cri teria (mixing military
needs with those ofHD) to plain ignorance
ofthe problems in the field. In many cases,
the inappropriateness of the design has
been made obvious early in its development,
but after the funds have been gran ted,
the work must go on.
Commercial equipment developers
have struggled to understand field needs
far more successfully. Examples include
the new generation of ground-compensating metal detectors and the increased
use of rebuilt mine-protected vehicles.
Many field groups have adapted existing
plant equi pment to meet their mechanicalassistance needs. Ironically, when they
have attracted R&D funding to do this,
their output has been far less focussed and
cost-effective.
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It is often sai d rha t
"eve ry mine cleared is a life o r limb
saved," a s tatemen t linked ro the notion that "deminin g is so slow that it
makes sense ro speed it up by reducing
rhe quality of the clearance."
T he truth is that incomplete clearance
of an area can lead to local people believing
the area is safe-and so starring ro use
it agai n. Thei r ri sk of injury actua lly
increases because some of the devices
were cleared. In this case, a mine cleared
can be direcdy responsi ble for a limb lost.
It is freq uen rly argued that "area
red uction" need not be as thorough as
clearance--so it should be acceptable to use
methods that are known to be inefficient.
Flai ls and o ne or other roller systems are
favourites- many of which are known to
be very inefficient at detonating pressure
devices and all of which leave UXO intact.
The advocates of these machines conveniently ignore the fact that UXO causes
as many civilian injuries as mines in many
co untries. The local people watch the
impressive machine work and believe that
the "reduced" area is actually a "safe" area,
so the distinction berween "area reduction"
and "area clearance" is lost on them. T hey
enter an unsafe area with false con fidence.
Parr of the reason that people make
these arguments is a desire ro find a use for
the machines--developed with millions of
dollars of research money bu t never able
to achieve the clearance levels of manual
deminers. Another reason is the perceived
need ro increase rhe speed of clearance
by using new tech nologies.
The truth is that it is better to mark a
dangerous area clearly and leave it until later
than ro release a dangerous area for use.

Myths, Mines and Ground Clearance
It is frequendy stared as an obvious
fact that we are just not working fas t
enough-and that chis justifies spend ing
huge amounts of money trying to develop
a faster way of cleari ng the ground than
by using manual deminers.
Bur manual demining is nor necessarily slow. It is in some areas-often due
ro lack of funding but sometimes due to
inefficient management. In many areas,
it is remarkably thorough and
fast, using manual deminers
assisted by machines and dogs.
Experi ence in Europe
provides evidence that speed
of clearance is no r really
rhe iss u e. More than 20
commercial EOD companies
sti ll operate in Germany, and
thousands of tons of WWI
ordnance are known to still
litter o ld barrie areas in
Belgium and France. What
is necessary is to establish a
sustainable local demining
capac ity-because so m e
clea rance is likely to be
needed for decades ro come,
no matter how fast people
work roday.
The truth is that manual
demining is only roo slow
when the necessary funds and
expertise are denied-and
that spe nding clea ran ce
money on speculative R&D
does not clear any ground
at all.

"Never mind
capacity building,
clear the area and
move on."

away from rhe mechanistic in-and-our
mindset of a military operation and into
the field of "sustainable development. "
Many people recognise this, bur rhe
industry is still dominated by ex-military
officers at all levels. The reason for this
dominance is not that demining requires
any military training or skills-especially
not those of senior officers. I believe that
the main reason is that H D was seen as a
job opportu nity for the many ex-officers

learn about rhe coumries and culrures
they find themselves in, and about HD as
opposed to military minefield breaching.
Bur the majority of those in high positions
in this industry have no relevant training
or preparation for a role that requires the
intelligent promotion of"sustainable development." Even the exceptions tend to have
short-term appointments that do not allow
sensible long-term planning.
To be fai r ro them, it is not always
obvious who should replace them. The "development" profession has had
ra ther roo many "fa ilures" to i nsp ire great
co nfidence. So those with
experience in development
programmes are not necessarily any better qualified, and even when they
are, they frequently believe
that you need soldiers ro
deal with explosives.
The truth is t hat a
new profession of HD is
eme rgin g- w ith peop le
"trained" by o n -the-job
experience. So me of these
are ex-soldi ers and some
ex-development workers.
If the ind u stry is to
progress, t he leaders of
the o ld school must move
as ide to ler chose who do
have the relevant experience
ro promote "sustainable
demining" takeover. Many
of these are ex-so ld iersbur demining management
should no t be allowed to
be a sinecure (or a retirement
home) fo r old officers. •

Deminer in Africa using locally made armour, visor and tools.

While it would be conven ient if
HD really d id involve a known number
of finite tasks that could be priorirised
and finis hed with mechanical precision,
past experience s hows that th is is just
a pipe dream. If it is accepted that
p roblems with ERW will remain fo r
decades as they have in Europe, th e
need ro develop a sustainable national
capaci ry becomes paramoun r.
This imperative moves HD completely

who carne into the job marker after the
end of the Cold War. They saw themselves
as being "rhe right people at the right
time." They may have been partly right,
bur a jobs-for-the-boys approach has
ensured that they appoi nt each other
in a cycle of well meaning bur relative
incompetence that has been impossible
ro break to dare.
There are a few notable exceptionsex-mili tary people who have set out to
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*Your comments and arguments would be
appreciated (see contact information
below).
*All graphics courtesy ofthe author.
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